Nigeria’s renewed push to build a military-industrial complex has taken an awkward turn, with the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria now reportedly searching for its supposed core investor, AMIS, a Brazilian concern that now appears missing, The Newsmatrics is reporting.
The Newsmatrics understands that such incongruity is raising eyebrows within the country’s defence and investment circles since former army chief and billionaire investor, Theophilus Danjuma acquired a huge stake in the company toward its revival.
The controversy comes against the backdrop of sweeping reforms introduced by the DICON Act 2023, signed by President Bola Tinubu, which expanded DICON’s powers and opened the defence sector to private and foreign capital.
The law effectively transformed DICON from a largely state-controlled ordnance factory into the nucleus of a broader military-industrial complex capable of forming joint ventures, licensing manufacturers, and regulating defence production.
The reform was meant to unlock billions of dollars in private capital and technology transfer for Nigeria’s defence sector, which has historically depended heavily on imports.
Nigeria’s domestic defence market alone, driven by the needs of the armed forces, paramilitary agencies and potentially state police, has been estimated at billions of dollars annually, with strong export potential within West Africa.
Nigeria’s defence spending his risen significantly from N21.8 trillion in 2023 to N 28.7 trillion in 2024 to N47.9 trillion in 2025 and up to 58.3 trillion in the 2026 budget proposals.
Partnerships everywhere,clarity nowhere
Since the legislation came into force, DICON has signed multiple agreements with both domestic and foreign partners.
These include:
A $2 billion joint venture with SP Offshore Nigeria Limited to produce ammunition, drones and other defence equipment locally.
A collaboration with RusselSmith Nigeria Limited to introduce industrial additive manufacturing (3D printing) into defence production lines.
Partnerships with firms such as D7G, Buckler Systems, and other local defence companies to ramp up production of arms and military hardware.
Officials say these agreements are intended to build a domestic supply chain for weapons systems, spare parts, drones and advanced military technologies while reducing Nigeria’s reliance on foreign procurement.
Yet the sheer number of memoranda of understanding and partnership announcements has also created confusion over which investor or consortium actually holds the status of anchor or core investor in the evolving structure.
The AMIS puzzle
This confusion is where the AMIS controversy emerges.
Reports that DICON is now “searching” for AMIS, the entity reportedly designated as its core investor, have triggered concern among analysts who say such a situation highlights deeper governance issues in the structuring of Nigeria’s defence industrial partnerships.
In conventional investment structures, the core investor is the anchor financier and strategic partner responsible for providing capital, technology, and management oversight.
The Newsmatrics reports that DICON in a letter dated 3 March, 2026 informed the Nigerian Stock Exchange of its inability to trace AMIS Limited, which holds a 40 per cent equity and last address given as Kirikiri Lighter Terminal in Apapa, Lagos State over an unspecified period of time.
The idea that a government-owned corporation could announce a core investor and later be unsure of its status or location is, according to analysts, an anomaly that underscores weaknesses in due diligence and institutional coordination.
“It raises the question: how was the investor vetted in the first place?” said one industry observer familiar with defence sector financing.
Structural challenges
The situation also reflects the broader difficulties of building a modern defence industry in Nigeria.
For decades, DICON struggled with underfunding, obsolete equipment and a narrow legal mandate that limited its ability to collaborate with private capital.
As Nigeria’s security challenges ranging from insurgency to banditry and maritime crime intensified, the country continued to spend billions importing weapons, spare parts and military systems.
The government’s strategy now is to localise production, turning defence spending into an industrial catalyst for jobs, technology transfer and export revenue.
Defence manufacturing is widely regarded as a powerful industrial multiplier, capable of stimulating sectors ranging from metallurgy and electronics to software engineering and advanced manufacturing.
Credibility risks
However, the credibility of that strategy depends heavily on the quality and transparency of its partnerships.
Analysts warn that the AMIS episode, if not clarified, could damage investor confidence in Nigeria’s nascent defence manufacturing ecosystem.
For foreign defence firms and private equity investors, the defence industry carries high political, regulatory and reputational risks.
Uncertainty around partnership structures or the identity of core investors could discourage serious international players from committing capital.
It also raises governance questions about how agreements are negotiated, vetted and communicated.
A strategic sector at stake
Nigeria has set ambitious targets to raise the share of locally manufactured defence equipment to about 40 percent of military needs within a few years, supported by major international collaborations and technology transfers.
If successful, the strategy could position the country as West Africa’s leading defence manufacturing hub, supplying both domestic security agencies and regional markets.
But for that vision to materialise, analysts say the sector must demonstrate transparency, credible partnerships and clear institutional coordination.
The curious case of DICON and its elusive core investor suggests that Nigeria’s defence industrial transformation, while promising, still faces significant governance and credibility hurdles.
